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  iIntroduction 
Traditionally, livestock growers have been responsible for managing manure and other 
waste products, appropriating any benefits (e.g., from use as fertilizer) and bearing any 
costs.  The spread of contracting in livestock industries has raised questions about the 
appropriateness of this situation.  It has been argued, for example, that integrators exert 
substantial operational control of contract livestock operations and should thus bear some 
responsibility for managing waste.  It has also been argued that integrators have deep 
pockets allowing them to finance needed investments in waste management structures 
and equipment that individual growers cannot afford. 
These arguments have led the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
several states to propose regulations that would make integrators and growers jointly 
responsible for disposing of wastes from contract livestock operations.  Growers and 
integrators alike have objected strenuously to these co-permitting proposals.  Integrators 
argued that they should not be liable for the actions of growers, whom they characterized 
as independent businesses over whose day-to-day operations they exercise little control.  
Growers have expressed fears that co-permitting would give integrators more leverage in 
bargaining over contract terms, thereby limiting grower’s ability to pass along 
compliance costs; that it would give integrators an excuse to interfere in growers’ 
operations and to terminate contracts; and that it would tie growers to specific integrators 
by forcing them to invest in specific waste management facilities not used by others 
(Boessen et al.) 
To date, there has been some rigorous analysis of the potential economic 
efficiency effects of proposals for joint responsibility for waste management in terms of economic efficiency but virtually none on potential impacts on the distribution of income 
between growers and integrators.  Liability for pollution damage may be appropriate in 
some cases where integrators do not contribute to production but growers are judgement 
proof in the sense of being unable to pay the full cost of any environmental damage they 
may cause (Heyes; Pitchford 1995, 2001; Boyer and Laffont; Balkenborg; Shavell 1987, 
1997).  Both integrators and growers should bear some liability for pollution damage 
when integrators play an active role in production under conditions of double moral 
hazard in the sense that the inputs of both grower and integrator are non-contractible 
(Aggarwal and Lichtenberg). 
This paper examines the efficiency and distributional implications of alternative 
forms of co-permitting, modeled generically as apportionment of liability for waste 
management between integrators and growers, in situations where production contracts 
feature conditions of single-sided moral hazard in which key inputs provided by growers 
(e.g., management) cannot be monitored or verified by integrators and in which 
integrators play an active role in production.  We show that growers should be liable for 
less than the full marginal cost of environmental damage in order to counteract the 
adverse incentive effects of contracting.  Integrators should also be liable for a share of 
environmental damage.  In contrast to the grower, it can be optimal for the integrator to 
be liable for more than the full marginal cost of environmental damage.  These results 
also carry over to the case where integrators play no active role in production. 
The distributional effects of co-permitting are analyzed under the assumption that 
growers differ in terms of waste disposal costs but are otherwise identical.  In the absence 
of regulation, waste disposal is assumed to be costless and hence irrelevant in 
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likely to lose existing contracts, regardless of how liability for waste disposal is 
apportioned.  Regulations requiring co-permitting may allow integrators to acquire 
information about waste disposal costs and/or require integrator-specific investments in 
waste handling facilities, reducing their bargaining power.  Thus, growers’ fears about 
potential adverse effects of co-permitting regulations appear to have a sound basis. 
A Model of of Livestock Waste Regulation 
Let output of finished animals, q, be a concave function f(x,z) of inputs selected by the 
integrator (x) and by the grower (z).  Let the social cost of environmental damage 
(equivalently, the cost of complying with an environmentally-determined waste 
management standard) be a convex function of those same inputs, h(x,z).  Assume that x 
and z are complements in both production and environmental damage, e.g., higher quality 
animals grow faster and produce more manure under better management.  This 
relationship is captured formally by assuming that the cross-partial derivatives fxz and hxz 
are positive.  Let p, w, and v denote the respective prices of q, x, and z.  Suppose also that 
output of finished animals and environmental damage are also both affected by stochastic 
factors, ε and η, respectively.  To simplify matters, assume that both are additive, so that 
realized output of finished animals is f(x,z)+ε and realized environmental damage is 
h(x,z)+η.
1 
                                                 
1 In this model, environmental damage can be reduced by lowering the usage levels of x and/or z; the cost 
of achieving reductions in environmental damage is a reduction in output and thus profit from livestock 
production.  An alternative modeling approach would be to consider the use of inputs specifically devoted 
to waste management.  The results obtained from such a model would be qualitatively equivalent to those 
derived from this formulation. 
  3The Social Optimum 
Socially efficient production is achieved by choosing usage levels of the inputs provided 
by the integrator and grower to maximize expected profit from livestock production less 
the expected cost of environmental damage, pf(x,z)-wx-vz-ch(x,z).  The necessary 
conditions characterizing socially optimal use of each input are (letting subscripts denote 
derivatives), 
( 1 )       p f x – w - hx = 0 
( 2 )       p f z –v - hz = 0, 
i.e., the value of the marginal product of each input (pfj, j = x,z) equals the unit cost of the 
input less the marginal cost of the environmental damage it causes (equivalently, the 
marginal cost of meeting the waste management standard; in either case, hj, j = x,z). 
Production in Contracts with Single-Sided Moral Hazard 
The model used in the preceding section is easily modified to incorporate the effects of 
contractual output sharing.  Suppose that the grower’s input z is non-contractible, being, 
for example, unobservable at reasonable cost or unverifiable if observed.  Consider a 
situation in which the integrator acts as a Stackelberg leader, choosing contract terms and 
how much of her input to provide given knowledge of the grower’s reaction to those 
contract terms.  Assume the use of a linear contract that gives the grower a share of 
output β in addition to a fixed payment α.  Let s and t be the shares of the social cost of 
environmental damage assigned exogenously by the regulator to the integrator and 
grower, respectively.  The optimal contract in this case involves the integrator choosing 
x, α, β to maximize her expected income (1-β)pf(x,z)-wx-sh(x,z)-α subject to two 
constraints: (1) an incentive compatibility constraint specifying that the grower chooses z 
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c = argmax 
{α+βpf(x,z)-vz-th(x,z)} and (2) a participation constraint ensuring that the grower’s 
income is no less than the income she could obtain outside of the contract, α+βpf(x,z)-
vz-th(x,z) ≥ u0. 
The equilibrium levels of output sharing (β) and input provision (x and z) are 
determined simultaneously by the conditions 
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(6)     α+βpf(x,z)-vz-th(x,z) ≥ u0. 
Condition (5) is the grower’s incentive compatibility condition.  It can be used to solve 
for z
c as a function of β and x and thus for the derivatives 































The fixed payment α can be derived independently in accordance with a rule for 
sharing the total surplus generated by the industry based on the relative bargaining power 
of the grower and integrator (Muthoo).  If the integrator has all the bargaining power, 
then the fixed portion of the grower’s compensation α is set to ensure that the 
participation constraint (6) holds with equality. 
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(1) and (2), respectively.  Equating condition (4) with condition (1) and condition (5) 
with condition (2) allows us to solve for the socially efficient shares of integrator and 
grower liability s* and t* conditional on the equilibrium output share β.  (Solving these 
two equations simultaneously with condition (3) yields socially efficient integrator and 
grower liability together with the equilibrium output share.) 
Consider first the grower’s share of liability (conditional on the equilibrium 
output share β): 
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It can be seen from condition (8) that the grower should be liable for less than the full 
social cost of environmental damage (if the grower were liable for the full social cost of 
environmental damage, her share t would equal 1).  Instead, the grower should be liable 
for the full social cost of environmental damage less an adjustment factor (1-β)pfz/hz 
designed to correct the distortion in her input provision due to the fact that she receives 
less than the full value of the marginal product of her input under her contract with the 
integrator. 
The integrator’s optimal share of liability for environmental damage is: 
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which can also be written as 
































  6As in the grower’s case, the integrator’s optimal share of liability for environmental 
damage is adjusted downward to accommodate the distortion in the provision of her input 
x due to output sharing.  In the integrator’s case, however, this adjustment takes into 
account both the direct effect of output sharing on the integrator (the term βpfx/hx) and 
the indirect effect of the integrator’s choice of x on the grower’s provision of her output 
z. 
In contrast to the grower, it is possible that the integrator should be liable for more 
than the full social cost of environmental damage, i.e., that the grower’s optimal share s* 
should exceed 1.  A necessary condition for such an outcome is -1 < ∂z
c/∂x < 0, the 
integrator’s and grower’s inputs are strategic substitutes (i.e., reductions in the usage 
level of the integrator’s input x induce the grower to increase the use of her input z).  In 
such cases, it is necessary to increase the integrator’s liability enough so that decreases in 
environmental damage due to reductions in x more than make up for any increases in 
environmental damage due to increases in z caused by reductions in x.  Note that a 
necessary condition for ∂z
c/∂x < 0 is that βpfxz < thxz, a reduction in x lowers the grower’s 
tax liability thxz more than her compensation for production βpfxz. 
It can be seen from conditions (10) and (10′) that co-permitting can be desirable 
(s* > 0) even when the integrator’s actions have no effect at all on environmental damage 
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c/∂x > 0.  Intuitively, co-permitting in this case is due to the strategic interaction 
between the integrator’s and grower’s (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer).  As a 
result, the integrator needs to be made liable for a share of environmental damage in 
order to correct distortions in production due to moral hazard on the part of the grower. 
Finally, adding up using conditions (9) and (10′), we find that the optimal liability 
for environmental damage imposed on the industry as a whole, s*+t* is 




























It is evident from equation (11) that s*+t* < 1 as long as the denominator of the fraction 
on the right hand side is greater than the numerator of that fraction.  As long as that 
condition holds, the industry as a whole should be liable for less than the full extent of 
environmental damage.
2  In essence, the discount on liability for environmental damage 
serves to compensate for the effects of grower moral hazard in production. 
In sum, then, when contracts for livestock production are designed to provide 
incentives for mitigating moral hazard in growers’ provision of management effort, we 
can conclude the following with respect to liability for environmental damage: 
1.  In most circumstances, joint integrator/grower liability is necessary to achieve 
socially optimal production and waste management together. 
2.  In most circumstances, both the grower and the integrator should be liable for less 
than the full social cost of environmental damage. 
                                                 
2 One would expect that condition to hold in all but pathological cases.  A necessary condition for it not to 
hold is that the two inputs are strong strategic substitutes (∂z
c/∂x < 0 and quite large in absolute value).  In 
that case, reductions in the integrator’s provision of x due to liability for environmental damage can trigger 
increases in the grower’s provision of z large enough to increase overall environmental damage.  Liability 
for more than total environmental damage is needed to compensate for this pathology. 
  83.  In most circumstances, the industry as a whole should be liable for less than the 
full social cost of environmental damage. 
Note that the industry as a whole can be made liable for less than the full social cost of 
environmental damage by adopting a hybrid policy that combines full liability for the 
social cost of environmental damage with subsidies for waste management designed to 
mitigate the effects of grower moral hazard in production.  Such a policy could utilize an 
ambient pollution tax along with waste management subsidies.  Alternatively, it could 
impose co-permitting that required the industry as a whole to adopt measures resulting in 
socially efficient generation and disposal of livestock waste along with subsidies that 
reduce the cost of production to mitigate grower moral hazard. 
Contracting over Waste Disposal Costs 
The analysis in the preceding sections assumed that the degrees of liability for 
environmental damage faced by the integrator and grower were both exogenous, imposed 
by a regulatory body.  It is more likely, however, that under co-permitting regulators 
would impose joint responsibility for meeting conditions of discharge permits (which 
generally take the form of following waste disposal procedures believed to provide 
adequate safeguards for environmental quality) without specifying how the costs of 
following those procedures should be split between contracting parties.  Under co-
permitting, therefore, the way in which the costs of meeting waste disposal standards are 
divided between integrator and grower will likely be negotiated as part of the terms of the 
contract in a manner similar to output sharing and fixed payment levels. 
The arguments of the preceding sections can be applied straightforwardly to the 
co-permitting case where waste disposal cost sharing is determined endogenously as part 
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disposal standard (instead of the social cost of environmental damage).  Clearly the cost 
of waste disposal is influenced by the nutrient composition of that waste, which is in turn 
influenced by nutrition, breeding, and placements, all of which are controlled by the 
integrator.  The cost of waste disposal is also clearly influenced by the grower’s 
management and other actions.  Thus, it makes sense to specify waste disposal cost as a 
function whose arguments include actions of both the integrator and grower. 
First, ignore for a moment the implications of output sharing.  Holmstrom’s 
budget balancing proof clearly applies to waste disposal since meeting the regulatory 
standard is a form output and since the fact that many of the choices that influence the 
cost of waste disposal are unobservable and/or unverifiable, creating a free riding moral 
hazard problem.  Thus, achieving a social optimum under co-permitting likely requires 
some form of waste management subsidies for both grower and integrator even in the 
absence of distortions induced by moral hazard in livestock production. 
Next, consider the implications of moral hazard in livestock production due to the 
non-contractibility of the growers’ management effort.  As before, consider a linear 
contract.  Let τ denote the share of waste management cost to be borne by the grower.  
The optimal contract in this case involves the integrator choosing x, α, β, and τ to 
maximize her expected income (1-β)pf(x,z)-wx-(1-τ)h(x,z)-α subject to two constraints: 
(1) an incentive compatibility constraint specifying that the grower chooses z (conditional 
on x, α, β, and τ) to maximize her expected income, z
c = argmax {α+βpf(x,z)-vz-τh(x,z)} 
and (2) a participation constraint ensuring that the grower’s income is no less than the 
income she could obtain outside of the contract, α+βpf(x,z)-vz-τh(x,z) ≥ u0.  The results 
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achieve a social optimum without (a) a waste management subsidy for the grower and (b) 
most likely a subsidy for the integrator (but possibly a penalty assessed in (unlikely) 
cases where the integrator’s and grower’s inputs are substitutes with a very large 
elasticity of substitution).  It follows that contracts that divide the entire cost of meeting a 
waste disposal standard between the integrator and grower cannot achieve the social 
optimum without subsidies for both growers and integrators.  In other words, co-
permitting can be efficient only if it is supplemented with the appropriate waste 
management subsidies for both growers and integrators. 
Co-Permitting and the Distribution of Income between Integrators and Growers 
Growers’ opposition to co-permitting appears to be motivated primarily by fears that it 
would redistribute income in a manner unfavorable to them.  For example, growers’ 
negative comments on EPA’s proposed co-permitting regulation all concerned potential 
adverse distributional effects such as decreased grower leverage in bargaining over 
contract terms, greater integrator interference in growers’ operations, and potential 
termination of contracts (Boessen et al.).  Of course, it is to be expected that the 
imposition of regulation by itself will have some adverse effects on growers’ (and 
industry) financial returns from contract livestock production.  It is important to separate 
the effects of imposing regulation per se from those of co-permitting.  This section 
considers these effects in turn. 
Impacts of Imposing Regulation on an Unregulated Industry 
Imposing regulations that force livestock producers to dispose of wastes in a manner that 
reduces negative environmental impacts (lowers the social cost of environmental 
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and growers in particular.  It is a truism that regulation will be costly: If the most 
profitable (or least costly) means of disposing of livestock waste caused no damage to the 
environment, there would be no need to impose regulation to protect environmental 
quality; thus, the need for regulation is by itself evidence that regulation will be costly.  
The additional costs imposed by regulation need not be completely, or even largely, 
financial.  The primary impact of regulation may be to require growers to exert more 
management effort and expend more of their own labor, both of which largely involve 
implicit costs rather than explicit monetary expenditures.  For example, a recent study by 
Lichtenberg, Parker, and Lynch found that poultry litter applied to cropland as a fertilizer 
substitute should be a profitable by-product of poultry production on the Delmarva 
Peninsula, even with transportation costs, application costs, and restrictions on 
application rates due to environmental regulations taken into account.  They argued that 
the main impediment to the profitability of using poultry litter this way was the lack of a 
marketing infrastructure and the consequent costliness (in terms of time and hassle) of 
arranging trades through individual barter arrangements. 
The fact that regulation will be costly to at least some growers implies that 
imposing regulation on an unregulated livestock production industry will lead to the 
termination of some existing contracts, regardless of the relative bargaining power of 
growers vis-à-vis integrators and regardless of whether co-permitting is imposed.  
Suppose for example that some growers have profitable ways to dispose of livestock 
waste (for example, using it as a fertilizer substitute on their own fields or selling it to 
neighboring crop producers) while others find waste disposal costly.  In the absence of 
  12regulation, the maximum cost of waste disposal is zero.  If the market for contracts is 
efficient, all those for whom waste disposal is profitable will be awarded contracts.  If the 
production capacity of those growers is less than integrators’ demand, some growers for 
whom waste disposal is costly will also be awarded contracts.  Contract awards to this 
latter group will be made without regard to potential disposal costs, however.  Once 
regulation is imposed, growers for whom waste disposal is profitable will retain contracts 
but some growers for whom waste disposal is costly will lose contracts to growers with 
lower disposal costs (or will opt out of contract livestock production because it is no 
longer profitable once disposal costs are internalized).  In other words, contract 
terminations can result from the imposition of regulation alone. 
A formal model may help make this point more clearly.  To simplify the analysis, 
assume that integrators do not play an active role in production and that growers differ in 
terms of their variable costs of disposing of livestock wastes in a manner that meets 
regulatory standards, denoted c, but are identical otherwise.  Production contracts feature 
output sharing to mitigate the effects of (one-sided) moral hazard due to the non-
contractibility of grower management effort, as before.  The participation constraint in 
this case is α+βpf(x0,z
c)-vz
c-c ≥ u0, where x0 is a fixed level of integrator inputs and z
c is 
the grower’s optimal input choice under the terms of the contract, specifically the output 
share β.  The cost of waste disposal c is negative for growers with profitable disposal 
options.  For growers for whom waste disposal is costly, the cost of waste disposal is 
equal to min{0,c} in the absence of regulation and positive (c > 0) otherwise.  Let G(c) be 
the number of growers with disposal cost no greater than c. 
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throughput that minimizes the total cost of operating the processing plant (if the average 
cost of processing is U-shaped and the integrator is a price-taker in the market for 
processed products, then this level maximizes processing profit).  The number of growers 
receiving contracts in this case will be Q/f(x0,z
c).  Suppose that each grower’s cost of 
waste disposal is private information (i.e., unknown to the integrator) but that the market 
for contracts is competitive.  In the absence of regulation, contracts will be awarded to all 
growers with negative disposal costs and to some growers with positive disposal costs.  
The integrator will be indifferent to the grower’s disposal cost since the fixed payment 
needed to induce participation will be independent of the disposal cost.  When regulation 
is imposed, however, integrators are no longer indifferent to waste disposal costs since 
the fixed payment needed to induce participation will rise to ensure that the marginal 
grower awarded a contract is compensated adequately for the cost of regulation.  Thus, 
contracts will be awarded to the growers with the lowest disposal costs up to the point 
needed to ensure total processing throughput Q.  The marginal grower awarded a 
production contract will have disposal cost c* defined by G(c*) = Q/f(x0,z
c) or c* =  
G
-1(Q/f(x0,z
c)).  If integrators offer a uniform contract to all growers, the fixed portion of 
the grower’s compensation α will be set to ensure an output level Q and will thus be 
(12)     .  ) , ( * 0 0
c c z x f vz c u β α − + + =
Three conclusions can be drawn from condition (12).  First, growers with waste 
disposal costs greater than c* will either find their contract terminated or will voluntarily 
exit the industry because contract livestock production is no longer more profitable than 
alternative occupations (which pay u0).  In other words, contract terminations can result 
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permitting.  Second, growers for whom waste disposal is profitable will earn additional 
rent from the imposition of regulation when integrators offer uniform contract terms to all 
growers.  Prior to regulation, they earned profit from waste utilization equal to c; after 
regulation they earn c*-c, benefiting from the fact that the cost of waste disposal of the 
marginal grower is passed on to the integrator.  Thus, when contract terms are uniform, 
some growers may actually gain from the imposition of environmental regulations 
imposing waste disposal standards that are costly at the margin but that do not involve 
co-permitting. 
In the analysis of the preceding paragraphs, all the costs of meeting regulatory 
standards for livestock waste disposal are passed on from growers to integrators.  The 
reason that integrators bear all the cost is that their demand for processing throughput was 
assumed to be perfectly inelastic.  It is possible, for course, that increases in the 
acquisition cost of finished livestock would lower the efficient scale of operation of the 
processing plant.  Such an effect is easily incorporated into the model by letting 
processing demand Q be a function of waste disposal cost Q(c) such that Qc < 0.
3  The 
marginal contract award in such a case would be made to a grower with disposal cost c** 
defined implicitly by G(c**) = Q(c**)/f(x0,z
c).  Incorporating this specification into the 
model would not change any of the qualitative conclusions as long as c** > 0, regulation 
remains costly at the margin.  The number of contract terminations and/or voluntary exits 
                                                 
3 The integrator’s average payment per unit of finished livestock is α/f(x0,z
c)+β, which can be written (after 
substituting for the equilibrium fixed payment α) as (u0+c**+vz
c)/f(x0,z
c), an increasing function of the 
waste disposal cost of the marginal grower, c*.  Since demand for throughput is downward sloping in price, 




  15would be larger and the rent earned by growers for whom waste disposal is profitable 
would be smaller than in the case of inelastic processing demand. 
Even allowing for reductions in throughput demand, it remains the case that all of 
the remaining growers’ costs of meeting regulatory waste disposal standards will be 
passed to integrators by means of the increase in the fixed portion of the grower’s 
compensation needed to ensure participation, α.  The underlying reason why integrators 
pay the full cost of waste disposal—and some additional rent—is because disposal costs 
are growers’ private information.  Furthermore, it seems unlikely to be feasible for 
integrators to develop contractual mechanisms that would allow them to avoid those 
costs.  Auctioning off contracts by having growers bid on the fixed payment α is unlikely 
to result in an equilibrium in which all growers bid their true reservation price, u0+c+vz
c-
βf(x0,z
c) because it will typically be easy for growers to exchange information, if not 
collude outright.  One would expect the outcome of such auctions to be a single price 
equal to c* (or c**).  Nonlinear pricing schemes are unlikely to be workable, either, 
because there tends to be little correlation between observable variations in outcomes 
(e.g., total production of finished animals or total manure generated) and disposal cost. 
The preceding analysis also assumed that all of the costs of meeting regulatory 
standards for livestock waste disposal were variable.  It is possible, however, that meeting 
these regulatory standards would require some investment in waste handling facilities and 
equipment.  The fixed costs arising from such investments (e.g., loan repayments) must 
be met whether or not the grower continues producing livestock under contract, unless 
the grower is able to sell all of the facilities for their full value.  If growers cannot recoup 
those investments when they cease contract livestock production, their earnings from 
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if waste handling capital is non-salable (e.g., because the industry shrinks in size in a 
given region), growers will not be able to pass their fixed cost obligations on to 
integrators.  Specifically, let k denote the grower’s annual fixed payments for 
irrecoverable investments in waste handling facilities and equipment.  (For simplicity, 
assume that all growers’ investments are the same.)  The net annual earnings of a grower 
in an alternative occupation will be u0-k.  The fixed payment guaranteed to the grower 
will thus be 
(13)     ,  ) , ( * 0 0
c c z x f vz c k u β α − + + − =
i.e., reduced by an amount equal to the annual irrecoverable fixed cost. 
Impacts of Co-Permitting 
Co-permitting gives integrators a direct interest in waste disposal.  As a result, 
integrators would likely alter the terms of production contracts to protect themselves 
against legal (and financial) liability for failure to meet waste disposal regulations.  One 
possibility would be to include in production contracts terms that explicitly define 
growers’ duties for waste disposal.  Another possibility would be for integrators to take 
ownership of livestock waste and oversee its disposal directly.  The former would likely 
result in a redistribution of income from growers to integrators.  The latter would likely 
not alter the distribution of income between growers and integrators unless integrators 
have opportunities for waste disposal that are not available to growers either individually 
or collectively. 
Giving integrators legal authority over waste disposal can result in a transfer of 
income from growers to integrators in two distinct ways.  First, incorporating waste 
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information about disposal costs, which could in turn allow integrators to appropriate any 
gains from waste disposal and ensure that growers paid all waste disposal costs.  Second, 
imposing specific waste disposal requirements could limit growers’ ability to change 
integrators by increasing the cost of making such a transition. 
Consider first the question of information provision.  One eminently reasonable 
way for integrators to show regulators that they had taken verifiable and enforceable 
steps to ensure compliance with waste management regulations would be to require 
growers to submit detailed waste disposal plans conforming to regulatory standards as a 
condition of being awarded a contract, with the proviso that failure to follow those 
regulatory standards would result in financial penalties and/or the loss of future contracts.  
Since waste management regulations typically impose due diligence requirements rather 
than strict liability for damages incurred, such a procedure could absolve integrators of 
legal liability by allowing them to demonstrate that they had taken adequate 
precautionary measures.  Such a process could, however, reveal to integrators each 
grower’s private information about waste disposal costs.  With that information in their 
possession, integrators could bargain individually with each grower over the size of the 
fixed payment needed to ensure the grower’s participation.  Since integrators likely have 
most, if not all the bargaining power, the result of such negotiations would likely be 
individual payment guarantees allowing the integrator to capture most, if not all, of the 
surplus generated in the production of finished animals.  If the integrator had all the 
bargaining power, for instance, the fixed payment for a grower with waste disposal cost c 
would be 
  18(14)     .  ) , ( ) ( 0 0
c c z x f vz c u c β α − + + =
The integrator would appropriate all profits from waste disposal (c < 0) and would force 
growers with positive waste disposal costs (c > 0) to pay the full amount of those costs. 
Integrators could also increase their leverage over growers by specifying that 
growers invest in integrator-specific waste handling facilities and equipment.  The annual 
payments for such investments would be irrecoverable if a grower switched from one 
integrator to another utilizing a different set of waste handling facilities and equipment.  
Waste handling contract specifications could be used in this manner to limit grower 
mobility and thus competition between integrators for growers, increasing integrators’ 
bargaining power relative to growers’.  As noted earlier, these irrecoverable fixed annual 
payments would also lower the fixed payment guarantee needed to ensure adequate 
grower participation. 
In contrast, integrators would seem to stand to gain little or nothing by taking title 
to (or physical possession of) livestock waste unless they have opportunities for disposal 
that are more profitable (or less costly) than those available to growers individually or 
collectively.  The amount of waste generated by each grower is unlikely to be correlated 
with disposal cost (or profit), so monitoring it would not allow integrators’ to devise 
nonlinear pricing mechanisms allowing them to appropriate profits from disposal (or 
ensure that growers pay any costs).  Taking possession of livestock waste is unlikely to 
reveal growers’ private information about disposal costs, either.  It could, however, be 
advantageous for integrators to contract for possession of livestock waste as well as 
finished livestock output under certain conditions.  For example, if the transaction costs 
involved in finding the most profitable/least cost disposal options are decreasing in the 
  19volume of waste handled, waste disposal could be less costly for integrators than 
growers.  Alternatively, integrators might be able to utilize economies of scale in some 
means of disposal.  One possible example is the Perdue/AgriRecycle venture on the 
Delmarva Peninsula that pelletizes poultry litter to sell as a component of fertilizer 
formulated for precision agriculture.  Perdue’s control over placements gives it the ability 
to coordinate (and ensure) deliveries of poultry litter at a lower cost than individual 
growers or than an outside firm.  It remains to be seen whether this venture will remain 
profitable, however. 
Conclusions 
This examines the efficiency of co-permitting and to its likely impacts on the 
distribution of income between integrators and growers.  We model co-permitting as a 
general form of joint liability for environmental damage from livestock waste imposed on 
both integrators and growers.  We show that joint liability for environmental damage 
offers a means of correcting distortions caused by moral hazard at the same time as it 
addresses environmental concerns—whether or not the integrator plays an active role in 
production.  We also show that, in most circumstances, (1) joint integrator/grower 
liability is necessary to achieve socially optimal production and waste management 
together; (2) both the grower and the integrator should be liable for less than the full 
social cost of environmental damage; and (3) the industry as a whole should be liable for 
less than the full social cost of environmental damage. 
Note that the industry as a whole can be made liable for less than the full social 
cost of environmental damage by adopting a hybrid policy that combines full liability for 
the social cost of environmental damage with subsidies for waste management designed 
  20to mitigate the effects of grower moral hazard in production.  Such a policy could utilize 
an ambient pollution tax along with waste management subsidies.  Alternatively, it could 
impose co-permitting that required the industry as a whole to adopt measures resulting in 
socially efficient generation and disposal of livestock waste along with subsidies that 
reduce the cost of production to mitigate grower moral hazard. 
Grower testimony regarding EPA’s proposed CAFO regulation expressed fears 
that co-permitting would have adverse effects on growers relative to integrators.  
Economic theory suggests that those fears have a basis: Co-permitting is likely to result 
in a redistribution of income from growers to integrators.  Regulation is likely to create 
opportunities for growers pass all of the costs of complying with waste management 
regulations and for some growers to earn additional rent due to their possession of private 
information about waste disposal costs.  Co-permitting could allow integrators to uncover 
that information, which would in turn allow them to force growers to bear all the costs of 
complying with waste management regulations and to appropriate all profits from waste 
disposal.  Co-permitting could also provide means for integrators to tie growers more 
tightly by making it more costly for growers to switch integrators. 
The analyses presented here were simplified in a number of important ways.  
Growers were assumed to be identical.  In reality, they are likely to differ in terms of 
management ability, creating problems of hidden information in production that would 
likely be addressed in contract terms and would thus influence the desirability of joint 
liability for environmental damage from livestock waste and the appropriate form of 
policies for addressing that damage.  Production contracts were assumed to be linear, 
with incentive payments based on total output.  Many livestock production contracts 
  21feature tournament compensation schemes in which incentive payments are based on 
relative productivity, e.g., higher than average feed conversion efficiency (Knoeber).  
Further research would be needed to assess the implications of these factors on the 
efficiency and distributional impacts of co-permitting. 
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